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1. Introduction
A great deal of economic literature gives the allocation of ownership a
fundamental role in outlining the conditions of efficiency for individual firms and the
productive system as a whole. This importance is moreover confirmed by the change in
ownership and organisational status that took place in the United Kingdom and other
countries in Western Europe at the beginning of the ‘80s.
The presence of re-allocation mechanisms of ownership and control of firms
represents a basic factor for the growth and development of a productive system (Barca,
1994). Relating to this topic, public ownership is certainly a restraining factor. This is
particularly true in Italy, where the public sector still plays a significant role in terms of
employment (20%) and value added (16%) (Zanetti and Alzona, 1998). The
privatization process can therefore be considered as a factor that may contribute to
improve efficiency. However, this change involves the nature of the ownership and the
capital market incentives issues. Public ownership could be criticised from several
aspects, such as: priority towards income distribution, managerial aims that are not
clearly defined, difficulty in defining the incentive mechanisms, easy access to credit
and, in the recent past, soft loans. The re-allocation of public ownership towards a
private one should contribute to solve the above-mentioned problems.
Industry aggregations could generate competitive sizes on an international scale.
From another viewpoint the increase in the quoted units could bear greater competition
on the financial market. However, it should be pointed out that privatization alone is not
sufficient to create competition and efficiency improvements. Liberalisation and
regulation of markets, especially for public utilities, are needed as well as a correct
working of the stock market. In the Italian context, the problem of “contestability” of
control is debated with a wide discussion on the future of the large utilities (Zanetti,
Alzona, 1998). The opinions in favour of an active control of the financial market, by
means of public companies, are compared with the models characterised by a stable
share-holding that protects the firm from hostile takeovers.
For the large Italian firms, an empirical analysis about the changing of the
efficiency deriving from privatization is at the moment not possible. Telecom Italia has
only recently been privatized and subsequently taken-over, the process is being
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undergone by Eni and has not even started yet for Enel. However, it should be
considered that in the last fifteen years many medium-sized industrial firms have been
privatized. Some of them have been incorporated or merged with others and therefore
cannot be identified. Others have been bought by groups and have maintained a legal
and administrative autonomy. These latter belong to sectors subject to competition both
at home and abroad, such as the steel, chemical, mechanics, textiles and food industries.
Up until a short time ago these sectors benefited from subsidies linked to location, or
more in general, public intervention policies.
This research refers to medium-sized firms that were privatized during the ‘80s
and the beginning of the ‘90s, where there is sufficient information to chart trends
before and after privatization. An analysis of the efficiency changes enables us to judge
the managerial capacity of private ownership in a broad sense, but it also enables us to
assess the governance of corporate performance.
This work is structured as follows: section 2 contains some theoretical suggestions
about the management of public and private ownership. Section 3 shows the main
empirical evidence about privatization found on an international scale, while sections 4
and 5 describe respectively the data base and the efficiency estimation methodologies.
Section 6 comments on the results. The conclusions can be found in section 7.
2. Privatizations: some literary contributions
The privatization processes in Europe and, in particular, in the United Kingdom
during the ‘80s and ‘90s have basically had the aims of reducing the state deficit,
developing stock markets and improving technical efficiency and profitability.
When dealing with the link between the nature of ownership and productive
efficiency, it seems possible to refer to two main explanations. The first viewpoint takes
into account the incentive mechanisms within the firm and shows that management
choices can be explained in different ways according to the institutional context they are
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placed in. The second one correlates efficiency to the greater dynamic and selective
capacities of open capital and product markets.1
2.1 Incomplete contracts and internal incentive mechanisms
The study  of economic relationships between agents shows how difficult it is to
define complete contracts. The parties (for example, buyer and supplier) cannot foresee
all future situation: this means asymmetric information and distortions in the
distribution of benefits. Such situations need appropriate incentive patterns (Tirole,
1988).
The long-run relationships are often characterised by specific investments that can
be seen as sunk costs and they can be recuperated solely by producing. Contracts that
call for such capital expenditures can take place only if the parties who bring the
relative resources have sufficient guarantees about the distribution of future economic
benefits. Moreover, the productive processes are usually carried out by technically
interdependent teams of human and physical capitals (Williamson, 1975). This fact,
together with the impossibility of regulating by contracts any future situation, makes
more probable opportunist behaviours by the participants in the relationship. To face
this situation, power of control and claim of benefits should be attributed to those
subjects that can maximise internal efficiency thanks to their greater experience,
capacity and their minimum degree of substitution in specific operational processes.
The purchase of residual rights of control2 by them3 would represent a second best
solution4 (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990; Hart, 1990). Furthermore,
                                                
1 Whereas the opening of the capital market is a result of privatization (since public ownership prevents
the circulation of property rights), competition on the market of products is, in theory, independent of
the type of ownership. In fact, there is the case in which a public firm competes against private ones
(Anderson, De Palma and Thisse, 1997), although the disciplinary role of the competition of the
product market is less binding for a public firm.
2 It would, therefore, be noted that, in this model, the residual rights only refer to non-human assets and
do not extend to the human assets that cannot be bought or sold (Hart, 1990).
3 For now, the issue of separation of ownership and control, that is to say, the conflict of interests
between ownership and managers, is not dealt with. The latter is normally closer to the  production
processes.
4 The first best solution appears in the case in which the contracts are complete and there are no doubts
nor threats of opportunism behaviours, since the contribution of non-owners would be maximised. In
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such a model of property rights, defined as GHM (Grossman-Hart-Moore), tends to
give re-allocative market mechanisms a decisive role for an efficient ownership set-up
(Barca, 1994). The presence of public shares limits the allocative capacity of the
property rights with negative results on the productive performance and innovation.
If attention is shifted to the separation between ownership and control, the
divergence of the objective-functions of the owners and managers takes on considerable
importance. Beginning with the studies carried out by Laffont and Tirole (1986), many
authors have concentrated on the comparison  between the efficiency of public authority
and that of private owners in defining managerial incentive schemes. The principal-
agent theory asserts that the principal finds it difficult to observe directly the actions
taken by the agent and know the real conditions of productivity. The managers, in this
way, can announce a managerial situation to be more difficult than in fact it is, so as to
guarantee a slack management. A more careful monitoring, however, would be able to
limit this moral hazard issue. In the private sector, the principal-agent relationship is
developed to a smaller number of layers compared to the public sector5. Therefore
privatization can be viewed as reducing the agency noise and facilitating the
introduction of more effective incentive schemes (Bös, 1991; Martin and Parker, 1998).
The control in the public sector is moreover influenced by the bureaucratic
behaviour of public officials (public choice theory). This process is not modified by the
vote of citizens because of very high political transaction costs. The public sector is
therefore conditioned  by the search for  a  rent-seeking activity on the part of managers
and workers together with political groups (Niskanen, 1971).
Vickers and Yarrow (1988), however, do point out the presence within the
objective-function of the government of a specific aim linked to social welfare (with
particular reference to quantities and prices). This means that only significant increases
in internal efficiency by the private operator (with a reduction of prices and tariffs) can
produce, in differential terms, an increase in wealth. Furthermore, the relative ease with
which the public government, by means of monetary incentives, is able to motivate the
                                                                                                                                     
this case, the ownership typology would have no influence on the definition of more effective
incentive schemes.
5 Whereas in a private firm there is a relationship only between shareholders (or partners) and directors,
in the public sector the agency relationship involves taxpayers, elected representatives, government
ministers and officials who will be running the firm.
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state firms, makes it preferable to maintain operative structures run by public power (De
Fraja, 1993).
2.2 The role of the market as a source of efficiency
Both the public and private structures present frictions between owners and
managers, but the private system has the advantage of specific incentive mechanisms
linked to the opening to competition of capital markets and products (Martin and
Parker, 1998). The theory of the market for corporate control emphasises how in a
market of transparent property rights, unaffected by asymmetric information and
organisational imperfections, an inefficient management of a private firm can turn into a
loss in value for the firm. This situation would make a takeover more likely by those
operators interested in obtaining profits by capital gains, following the recovery in the
productivity level (Vickers and Yarrow, 1988; Barca, 1994). So the threat of takeover
positively influences the efficiency6.
Nevertheless, the risk of bankruptcy can weigh upon private economic units. This
threat occurs since these latter are not supported by public funding and financing on
favourable terms and are, on the contrary, marked by a harder budget constraint. This
fact may make the administration more aware of the needs for money-saving and
therefore of control of inefficiencies. In an empirical analysis of Italian publicly-owned
firms Bertero and Rondi (1998) clearly shows how the passage from a soft to a hard
budget constraint is reflected in a greater caution in the use of resources by the state
managers themselves. However, Schmidt (1996) notes that a government intervention
geared towards making the financing system of a public firm more restraining is
absolutely unfeasible. A similar behaviour would be perfectly reasonable with regards
to a private firm with the possible outcome, however, of a reduction in quantities
produced.
                                                
6 The takeover operation might not succeed, especially with regards to firms with widespread
ownership, because of free-raider behaviour by the owners. In this case, each shareholder can decide,
independently of each other, to retain their own share because keeping it would give them the
possibility to gain the price increase following the raid (Tirole, 1988; Vickers and Yarrow, 1988;
Trento, 1992).
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An open and competitive capital and product markets in any case represents a
fundamental assumption for any privitazation program. They can generate advantages
both in terms of technical and allocative efficiency (Kay and Thompson, 1986; Yarrow,
1986). The dynamics characterising the market of property rights would have a more
influence on less efficient economic subjects. The simple substitution of a public
monopoly with a private one, instead, would contribute to the creation of a bureaucratic
structure as inefficient as the correspondent state-owned one. Recent works (Nickell,
Wadhwani and Well, 1992; Nickell, 1996) emphasise how market concentration is
reflected in reduced productivity levels. This is due to a scant managerial tension that
can be attributable to the presence of monopolistic positions.
When privatization accompanies a development of competition, it may be easier
for the monitors to operate cross-sectional comparisons between homogenous firms. In
this way they can deduce information regarding the normal level of the productivity
performances (yardstick competition). In any case, since the market share proves to be
inversely correlated to cost dimension (Hay and Liu, 1997), a firm aimed at
development policies should limit any kind of inefficiency.
3. The empirical studies
The empirical surveys about ownership changes (public versus private) mainly
refer to the British context, which experimented privatization on a wide scale in the last
twenty years. The measures of performance are generally made up of profitability,
efficiency, capital investment and leverage indicators, cost functions, level of labour
employed. Many studies tend to focus on the short run efficiency and neglect the long
run impact of privatization. This is especially due to the subsequent corporate
transformations and the fact that the phenomenon is fairly recent. Analysing the impact
on allocative efficiency is more difficult given the need to evaluate whether prices and
new products have influenced the general wealth. Table 1 gives a general view of a set
of contributions taken from literature.
Interpreting the various results is not always simple because of frequent
interactions among different economic policies such as creation of competitive product
and capital markets (Kay and Thompson, 1986; Yarrow, 1986), new industry
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regulations and restructuring of the privatized firms. This makes unclear the evaluation
of the effects of the privatization itself. Moreover, the question concerning the effective
enhancement in performance after public divestiture does not find a complete agreement
in theoretical and empirical literature.
A large part of the studies analysed do not give unambiguous evidence on the
suitability and economic advantages from the privatization process. This result is
strengthened by the positive productivity performances obtained by UK publicly-owned
firms (Molyneux and Thompson, 1987; Vickers and Yarrow, 1988; Hutchinson, 1991;
Bishop and Thompson, 1992). On the contrary, Dewenter and Malatesta (1998)
comparing publicly and privately-owned large firms around the world, show that the
former are less profitable, more leveraged and more labour intensive than the latter.
They, however, provide little evidence for the effectiveness of privatization itself and
then hypothesise that a switch to private ownership is in fact subordinated to previous
restructuring processes. An increase in productivity performance in advance compared
to the actual time of privatization is also highlighted by Martin and Parker (1995). This
is due to the activity directed to make the placement of the assets onto the market easier.
The results from a set of UK firms that were privatized or changed their
organisational status within the public sector do not seem to guarantee notable
improvements in total productivity (Dunsire, Hartley and Parker, 1991; Hartley, Martin
and Parker, 1991; Hartley and Parker 1991a; Hartley and Parker 1991b; Boussofiane,
Martin and Parker, 1997). Furthermore, these analyses show that the greatest
contribution to the increase in technical efficiency is linked to the labour factor that is
more involved in the transaction costs of the public sector. In fact, state-owned firms
pursue political rather than economic strategies, aimed to widen the public consensus
towards the politicians in power. This situation can lead to oversize the employment
level with negative returns on the conditions of operative efficiency (Pint, 1991;
Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny, 1996). This behaviour seem to be confirmed by empirical
studies based on the analysis of Total Factor Productivity and Labour Productivity
(Martin and Parker, 1995). After privatization it is possible to see a sharper growth in
labour productivity than in the total factor indicator. This fact suggests the idea that
substitution between capital and labour and removal of the excess of work-force created
by the public management have occurred. However, In contrast with these conclusions,
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Megginson, Nash and Van Randenborgh (1994), analysing a large sample of privatized
firms around the world, show that the divestiture not only provides statistically
significant increases in real sales, profitability, operating efficiency, capital spending
and dividend payments ratios but also in the level of employment.
A more correct evaluation of the impacts of sells-off needs to take into account
two exogenous variables: technological progress and industry business cycle. During a
study concerning the privatization of British Gas, Waddam Price and Weyman-Jones
(1996) credit the improvement in performance mainly to technological progress
(frontier shift) rather than to an advancement towards efficiency frontiers (catching-up).
The importance of the demand variable is confirmed by Haskel and Szymanski (1993).
They also underline how the divestiture has also had significantly less influence
compared to the degree of the opening to market competition.
As far as the effects of privatization in Italy are concerned, Sarno (1993) and
Fraquelli and Fabbri (1998) agree on the improvement showed by the short run
profitability and labour productivity. However the privatized units maintain high levels
of financial leverage.
4. The data base
The analysis is based on a sample of 39 Italian medium-size industrial firms
controlled mainly by private large groups.
Privatized firms were identified by “Banca Dati Nomisma” and “Mediobanca”
sources. Each firm was observed over the period from 1975 to 1996, with time series
not less than 6 years, distributed before and after privatization.
The balance-sheet data were taken from the Ceris Panel (Margon, Sembenelli,
Vannoni, 1995) until 1993 and directly from the “Mediobanca” sources for the
subsequent three years. In particular, the selected variables are: sales (SAL) and value
added (VA) as measure of output, the number of employees (NEMPL), the gross fixed
assets (GFA) as measure of real capital, the net capital stock (NCS), total equity plus
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financial liabilities, as measure of financial capital and the costs of materials and
services (CMAT)7, as input variables.
The monetary values have been deflated8 using specific industry prices indices (3
digit) and choosing 1993 as the base year. The deflation of fixed assets turned out to be
more complex. The eighth report issued by the “Centrale dei Bilanci” (1995), provides a
time series of aggregated balance-sheet between 1984  and 1993 that have been
corrected according to the Current Purchasing Power (CPP) accountancy system. By
using them it has been possible to build up a set of implicit deflators (DEFLt) regarding
gross fixed assets (AGGRGFAt), for t included between 1984 and 1993, as follows
9:
AGGRGFAt,93 / AGGRGFAt,t  = DEFLt,93
By applying these coefficients to the balance-sheet values of each firm i, from
1984 to 1993, the series of rectified items, according to the prices of the base year, have
been obtained as follows:
GFAi,t * DEFLt,93 = GFAi,t,93.
For the years prior to 1984 and following 1993, that were not available from the
“Centrale dei bilanci” report, the series have been completed by a direct estimate carried
out according to the technique of perpetual inventory method.
5. The measures of efficiency
The analysis of technical efficiency has been carried out  by applying Data
Envelopment Analysis (DEA). This is a method introduced by Charnes, Cooper and
Rhodes (1978) as a generalisation of the Farrell index (1957) based on the concept of
the efficiency frontier. This frontier is made up of those units (Decision Making Units,
DMUs)10 that, compared to the others, minimise the use of productive resources given
                                                
7 This value, that was not available in the “Mediobanca” sources, was obtained from the difference
between sales and value added for each firm in each year.
8 The deflation procedures of the monetary balance-sheet values are those found in Fraquelli (1997).
9 In this formula, t indicates the general year to which the aggregate refers, whereas 93 is the base year
of prices index.
10 As the DEA method can be adapted to a varied system of units that have decision making capacities,
even not organised as a firm (schools, hospitals, etc), it would seem appropriate to use the general
term DMU.
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the output (input-oriented measure), or maximise the output given the input size
(output-oriented measure).
The basic idea behind the DEA methodology is represented by figure 1, where the
isoquant drawn refers to an elementary case with two productive factors (x1 and x2) and
one output (y). Points A, B, P are all associated to a unit level of production, but only A
and B lie on the efficiency frontier, since there are no units able to carry out productive
combinations that are more efficient. Farrell’s coefficient (technical efficiency, TE),
measures the distance that separates the points from the frontier line. It turns out to be
equal to the maximum value 1 for the units (DMUs) indicated as A and B (peer group
of point P), whereas firm P’s efficiency is defined by the ratio TE=OQ/OP, where Q is
the radial projection of P on the frontier.
Given n DMUs, the efficiency input-oriented frontier can be obtained by solving
Linear Programming problems (LPs) in a dual form with m+k constraints (Coelli,
Prasada Rao and Battese, 1998), of the type:
Minl q q,
 s.t.  - y Yi r, + ³l 0    r=1,...,m output
        q lx Xi t, - ³ 0     t=1,...,k input
        l³ 0
with i=1,..., n, where q  (0 £ q £ 1) is a scalar that measures the efficiency score of the i-
th DMU, yi,r and xi,t represent vectors Mx1 and Kx1 of all outputs and inputs for the
same firm i, l is a vector Nx1 of weights assigned endogenously to the units considered
and Y and X are matrices of m outputs and k inputs respectively of size MxN and KxN 11.
As an alternative, the coefficient q, subjected to a minimising process, can be read by
considering the difference between the maximum score equal to 1 and the actual index
                                                
11 If the projection of a DMU takes place on the horizontal or vertical facet of the frontier (figure 1),
there is a input slack (IS), expressed in the form: IS = qx
i, t
 - Xl. It implies the possibility of further
reducing some inputs without changing the quantity of output, by means of a non radial movement
along the frontier. These slacks are an inevitable consequence of the frontier construction method
chosen (DEA) and of the fact that finite samples are used. Moreover, in order to evidence all potential
IS, Coelli, Prasada Rao and Battese (1998) suggest the use of the more sophisticated multi-stage
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value. This represents the potential efficiency gain in the use of the factors, given the
output and maintaining the same operative mix12.
In this work, the DEA methodology has been applied on data structured in time-
series, instead of over cross-sections (Boussofiane, Martin and Parker, 1997). Each year
referring to an individual firm represents a DMU. For each firm the frontier is
calculated across the years and the comparison is made between the annual efficiency
scores. This approach has the ultimate aim of examining the conditions of efficiency of
each firm before and after privatization.
The period for which DMUs are observed differs with respect to calendar years
and their length. To make a comparison possible, the privatization years of the 39 firms
were indicated by central time t. The same was done for the previous and subsequent
years, called t-1, t-2, up until t-5 and t+1, t+2, up until t+5. Then, for each year, we
calculated the average of the efficiency scores of all the firms.
Since the number of observations between t-5 and t+5 differs year by year, the
full sample of 39 firms appears as unbalanced. To test the robustness of the efficiency
ratings obtained from the unbalanced sample, the statistics were also carried out for two
balanced sub-samples. They include respectively the 25 firms that cover the whole
range t-3, t+3, and the 16 firms that cover the whole range t-4, t+4. In this way, the
years have all the same number of observations.
As a same firm is compared over a short time series, it was considered correct to
operate with the DEA model at constant returns to scale (CRS)13. It seems to be rational
to hypothesise absence of modifications of the productive scale. The consideration of
the variable returns to scale (VRS) would seem to be more appropriate, on the other
                                                                                                                                     
method, that is applied in this work. It involves the resolution of a sequence of radial LPs to identify
the efficient projected point.
12 For a given linear programming problem, only the units that make up the peer group of a specific
DMU will take on the values l different from zero (points A and B in figure 1 with reference to the
inefficient unit P). In this way the projected point Q repeats the technology used by the original unit P
and identified by the linear combination lAA+lBB.
13 The DEA model with the CRS system refer to LPs that have been presented in this work. The variable
returns to scale model (VRS) foresees, instead, the addition of the following equality constraint
(Coelli, Prasada Rao and Battese, 1998):
å
=
=
n
i
i
1
1l
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hand, for data that are structured according to a cross-section. In this case the firms can
in effect present different scales.
The methodology described above is non-parametric. This means that it needs
neither the specification of underlying production functions nor sets of weights for the
different inputs and outputs used (Coelli, Prasada Rao and Battese, 1998). With
reference to the case being studied, it must however be noted that the scores simply
indicate the dispersion of efficiency of each firm during the period. It is therefore not
possible to provide a judgement regarding the relative level of efficiency between the
firms14.
For reflecting the dynamics of the industry business cycle a further input variable
was included into the DEA system15. This is represented by the index number of the
industry gross product where a value equal to 100 is assigned to the year of
privatization16.
The statistic significance of the differences in the efficiency ratings of the firms
observed before and after privatization was examined using the Wilcoxon paired test17.
The homogeneity in the efficiency behaviour was investigated considering the two
averages of the ratings, for every firm, prior to and following the t time. The test was
based on three levels of significance a (1%, 5%, 10%).
                                                
14 So as to assess the impact of technological progress, the distribution of the different firm-years along
the frontier were investigated. It was noted in particular  if the units before and after privatization are
placed in (two) defined clusters; this would be a clear indicator of  a change in technological
conditions. Since the test is not significant, it can be felt that the analysis maintains its own
explanatory effectiveness even without introducing a technological progress variable.
15 The trend of demand is, in fact, an exogenous element that is able to affect efficiency levels. In
particular, it can be hypothesised that there is a positive correlation between the variations of the
demand and the rate of productivity. (Boussofiane, Martin and Parker, 1997). A period of too high or
too low demand may, respectively, cause an over or under estimation of the DEA scores.
16 These aggregated data have been taken from the ISTAT source.
17 The Wilcoxon test is of a non parametric nature, suitable to test if two dependent samples show the
same behaviour relative to a specific characteristic. It is based on the replacement by ranks of the
differences in absolute value of the observations referring to the corresponding elements in the two
dependent samples (or to the same element observed before and after a particular treatment).
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6. The results
6.1 Analysis of technical efficiency using DEA indices
The unbalanced sample (table 2) that counts all the 39 firms for the years included
between t-5 and t+5 do not show clear and significant changes in the dynamics of
global efficiency. DEA indices are built under the hypothesis of constant returns to
scale (CRS) on both SAL and VA. Table 2 also shows the ratings relative to the two
balanced samples including respectively 25 firms for the three years before and after
privatization and 16 firms for the years between t-4 and t+4. The last two samples
examined confirm the results of the unbalanced one. However, there seems to be an
upward gap during the years between t and t+2 (the phase immediately after
privatization), followed by a settling or even a deterioration in the performance as
shown in figure 2. The improvement of the efficiency seems therefore to be a purely
transitory benefit, incapable of strengthening the productive structure of the firms
transferred to the private sector.
The annual variability of the efficiency values is slightly accentuated if the output
is measured by the VA, although not statistically significant. Given the relatively
reduced number of observations for each firm, the elimination of an input variable
(CMAT), occurring when VA is used as output measure, makes the model more
selective18. In any case, the dynamics of the average efficiency seems to confirm the
indices based on the SAL.
In table 3, the DEA ratings were calculated including the industry business cycle
variable. This last explanatory factor makes a redefinition of the productive frontier as
well as of the ranking of the firms in every year and produces an upwards shift of the
average values of the DEA indices19. We can see, even though not to a significant
extent, a short run variation on the two years immediately following the sell-off.
                                                
18 When indicating the possible limits of the methodology, Coelli, Prasada Rao and Battese (1998) state
that: “The addition of an extra input or output in a DEA model cannot result in a reduction in the TE
(Technical Efficiency) scores", p. 181.
19 A satisfactory discrimination power is achieved when the number of observations (in this case, the
number of year for each firm) is three times the number of input times the number of output
(Boussofiane, Dyson and Thanassoulis, 1991). If the number of observation lies below this boundary,
the DEA ratings will tend to move gradually towards the frontier.
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However, the gaps between the periods before and after privatization turn out to be
further reduced and this evolution seems to confirm the absence of changes in the
technical efficiency.
6.2 Different subgroup tendencies
The sample of 39 firms is quite representative of the privatized units in Italy, but
turns out to be small with reference to the single industrial sector. Anyway, we will see
later that belonging to certain industrial sectors is a fairly significant element so as to
interpret the results. However, it is more useful here to aggregate the firms according to
the nationality of the new owners (Italian or foreign groups). The data can be found in
table 4.
The comparison between the acquisitions by foreign groups and those of private
national ones shows different behaviour. The first sub-sample (eight units) is
characterised by a recovery of efficiency process prior to privatization and maintains its
continuity also during the subsequent period. The second is stable in the pre-
privatization period and evidences a small decline in the post-privatization one. It is,
moreover, important to note the statistic significance of the diversity between the years
before and after privatization for the indices based on VA relating to firms under foreign
control.
6.3 Factors productivity
The search of the main factors explaining the trend of total technical efficiency
suggests the calculation of partial productivity indices, taking as output both SAL and
VA at constant prices, and aggregating the inputs GFA and NCS. For each firm the
highest annual value was made equal to 100, and the whole time series was re-
calculated over this benchmark. The results can be found in table 5.
The disaggregation of the productive factors shows that the stability of the
efficiency index is the result of a positive performance of the labour and a negative one
regarding the materials and (real and financial) capital. The average labour productivity
values reveal a statistically significant gap of about 10-15 points in favour of the period
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following privatization. However, it should be noted (figure 3) that there is a constant
growth trend, at least until t+2, that characterises even the pre-privatization phase20.
The dynamics of the NEMPL variable reveals that also in Italy, despite certain
rigidities in the labour market, this resource has a greater flexibility compared to the
other productive factors. The improvement of the labour productivity between t and t+2
is probably the element responsible for the positive gap observed in the same years by
DEA ratings. However, this progress occurs within a background already oriented
towards an increase in efficiency.
6.4 Evaluation of the results
It is quite difficult to pinpoint the specific effect of the privatization from other
elements of an exogenous and endogenous nature. In any case, the results give some
interpretative keys.
Labour productivity trend shows that the privatization process is associated with
some important effects before the divestiture itself. At a managerial level, this evidence
underlines the intention to “prepare” the firms for the transfer into a private financial
market context by cutting the level of work-force21. The wide recovery of labour
productivity confirms the hypothesis of serious over-sizing of this factor when the firm
is subjected to public control (Pint, 1991; Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny, 1996). The
priority for the employment in the objective function of the public owner together with
the lack of profitability incentives and financial constraint tends to create an excess in
the number of the employees. In their empirical studies of Italian privatizations,
Fraquelli and Fabbri (1998) confirm an excess employment for the publicly-owned
firms but to the detriment of (low) salary levels.
For the other productive factors (materials and capital) the trends are lacking of
evident progress. This tendency leads to think that the strategies developed by the
                                                
20 The data of the firms included in the sample reveal that the growth in labour productivity is associated
with a decreasing number of employees during the observed periods.
21 Bertero and Rondi (1997), by a panel of private and public Italian firms, have shown a changing in the
behaviour during the passage from a soft to a hard budget constraint (that took place at the end of the
80s). Even the state firms became more sensitive to the financial pressure, improving total
productivity and reducing employment.
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management of the privatized firms are affected by short-terminism biases. The
effectiveness of private control, in theory characterised by a harder budget constraint,
has only partially worked. Only the labour factor is supposed to be the main source of
inefficiency and then received particular attention. Thus, the above analysis gives
evidence of a partial failure of the private corporate control.
This occurs even though the economic units of the sample operate in sectors, such
as mechanics, steel, textiles and food industry that are open to competition incentives.
The presence of a dynamic capital market together with a competitive product market
should however provide a background suitable for a complete development of the
potentialities of private ownership (Kay and Thompson, 1986; Yarrow, 1986)22.
In judging the role of the “new” private ownership it must be emphasised that in
Italy the efficiency incentive mechanisms, over the period when the main privatizations
took place, turned out to be fairly weak, and still are. One of the reasons is probably the
mass of economic and financial government subsidies that many of the public firms
enjoyed before (and after) undergoing privatization. As stated above, most firms belong
to the mechanics, steel, textiles and food industries. These sectors widely benefited in
the past years from an industrial policy built upon contributions and subsidies.
Furthermore, in some cases the firms were purchased and then sacrificed because of
incentives geared towards the reduction of the productive capacity or policies aimed at
the concentration of sales.
Among the interpretative hypotheses of the failure to recover efficiency, it must
be stated that the Italian financial market is quite weak. The productivity measure had a
poor increase after privatization although the product market environment was open to
competition and suitable for an efficiency enhancement. So it can been hypothesised
that the private ownership itself or, more probably, the disciplinary role of the Italian
capital market failed. This interpretative suggestion is also sustained by the better
results relative to the firms acquired by groups of foreign countries with more dynamic
financial market conditions 23.
                                                
22 In a competitive context, the poor profitability of an economic unit can be interpreted by the market as
an indicator of inefficiency. The negative judgement of the management activities can place the firm
under the risk of takeover with the subsequent replacement of its managers.
23 It is opportune to note that the reference to financial market conditions of foreign countries, though
realistic, is to be taken with some cautions. In fact, the number of observations is limited and the time
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The Italian financial market is characterised by a strong concentration of the
holding ownership, with a primary role of the families24. In this way, the ownership re-
allocation function becomes weaker and it makes, consequently, the managers’
efficiency incentives less sharp. Such a rigid share-holding system in Italy has been
worsened further by a poor influence of the credit institutions (Barca and Ferri, 1994).
Till now the Italian banks have had ineffective capacity of controlling and addressing
the entrepreneurial choices of the subjects financed.
The unsatisfactory efficiency performance cannot be therefore directly ascribed to
the failure of the private model. The absence of contestable ownership structures, with
the threat of “new” controllants, may have prevented managerial incentives. This
hypothesis is supported by the work of Barca and Ferri (1994) concerning the re-
allocation process within the private sector between 1985 and 1990. During the period
following the change in ownership, the improvements are ascribed solely to the
financial area and not to the industrial strategy.
7. Conclusions
The Data Envelopment Analysis applied to 39 firms privatised during the ‘80s and
the early ‘90s shows that there have not been significant changes in the conditions of
technical efficiency. More particularly, the efficiency improves in the two years that
follow the privatization. It then falls, except in the case of foreign acquisitions, to levels
even lower compared to the initial ones. The only change statistically significant regards
the strong and continuous recovery in labour productivity, that is evident also during the
period subject to public control.
Such an evolution, at least as far as Italy is concerned, must not however lead to
negative conclusions regarding privatization.
                                                                                                                                     
series do not exceed the year t+3. Furthermore it would seem that the investments of foreign operators
are characterised by better performances (Caves, 1996; Dilling-Hansen, Eriksson, Madsen and Smith,
1999).
24 Cannari, Marchese and Pagnini (1994), with reference to 1991, assert: "from a sample of firms it
emerges that the first three shareholders own 71 and 91 per cent respectively of the equity of quoted
S.p.A. and joint-stock companies”, p. 259.
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In fact, it must be considered that the Italian system is not characterised by rules
that enable a contestable market for private ownership. The “culture” is insufficient and
not yet developed, as well as a “complete economic and political liberal system"
(Zanetti and Alzona, 1998). This situation brings about two different consequences
interesting the privatized firms. Government interventions into the management are only
partially excluded, especially in the public utility sector25. Even if state interference
stops completely, the re-allocation mechanisms of the private control are insufficient.
Consequently, the efficiency increases foreseen by theory can not be obtained.
The problem to be faced in the immediate future is not therefore linked to the
opportunity to privatise but to facilitate the access onto the product and corporate
market control.
                                                
25 In concluding the analysis geared towards "understanding privatizations" Zanetti and Alzona (1998)
maintain that Italy can have only “imperfect privatizations” compared to the liberal model that totally
limits government interference. These operations would anyway be preferable to public control,
especially in view of the greater incentives resulting from the constraints of the European Community
currency and the pressure made by the globalisation of the market.
Table 1 - Main empirical studies
Authors Years Firms and period covered Methodology Empirical findings
Molyneux and Thompson 1987 State-owned versus privately-owned UK
firms in various sectors between 1978 and
1985.
Labour and total factor productivity. Productivity growth is faster in the state-owned
firms.
Vickers and Yarrow 1988 9 UK state-owned firms over the two
periods 1968-78 and 1978-85.
Labour and total factor productivity. Improvement in the performance, specially on
labour, between 1978 and 1985, but for public
utilities. Capacity of public sector to achieve
good performance.
Hutchinson 1991 17 UK state and privately-owned firms in
several industrial grouping (SIC), in the
1970s and 1980s.
Labour productivity, profitability and
technology mix.
Privately-owned firms outperformed comparable
state-owned ones in the 1970s and in the 1980s
in terms of profitability only. Scarce evidence of
privatisation gains.
Dunsire, Hartley and Parker 1991 9 UK organisations that were privatised or
underwent changes in their organisational
status within public sector from 1969 to
the mid-1980s.
Labour and total factor productivity,
employment and financial ratios.
The relationship between status change in
direction of private sector or commercial
pressure is not guaranteed. Only three cases of
actual privatisation.
Hartley, Martin and Parker 1991 10 UK organisations that were privatised
or underwent changes in their
organisational status within public sector.
Observations over the 4 years before and
after status change.
Labour and total factor productivity. Discordant conclusions specially with
introduction of the business cycle variable. The
removal of the political power doesn’t guarantee
improvements in efficiency. Only three cases of
actual privatisation.
Hartley and Parker 1991 a 9 UK organisations that were privatised or
underwent changes in their organisational
status within public sector. Observations
over the 4 years before and after status
change.
Financial ratios:
· profitability (ROCE)
· sales to fixed assets
· stocks to sales
· debts to sales
· labour’s share in costs
· value added per employee.
The ratios show no substantial improvement in
the performance after organisations are subjected
to private sector or commercial pressures.
Hartley and Parker 1991 b 9 UK organisations that were privatised or
underwent changes in their organisational
status within public sector over the period
1959-88.
Estimate of employment functions for
verifying shake-out processes and labour
productivity indices.
Concordant results between the two types of
methodology. More substantial is the weight of
transformation, greater the improvement in
labour productivity. Only three cases of actual
privatisation.
Bishop and Thompson 1992 9 UK state-owned firms over the two
periods 1968-78 and 1978-85.
Labour and total factor productivity. The productivity show a faster growth during the
1980s in comparison with the 1970s. The
evidence is stronger for labour factor.
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Haskel and Szymanski 1993 12 UK firms privatised between 1972 and
1989.
Labour productivity functions using
economic, dummies and business cycle
variables.
The business cycle and the degree of
competition have significant and positive impact
on labour productivity. The coefficients of
ownership (private versus public) are not
significant.
Sarno 1993 10 Italian privatised firms observed over
the 3-4 years before and after privatisation.
Economic and financial indicators and
estimate of production function.
Only the short-run profitability and the labour
productivity show a considerable improvement
after privatisation.
Megginson, Nash and Van
Randenborgh
1994 61 privatized firms, from 18 countries and
32 different industries, observed pre and
post privatization over the global period
1961-90.
Profitability, opertaing efficiency,
dividend payout and capital spending
indicators; leverage ratios; real sales and
employment level.
Statistically significant increase in real sales,
profitability, operating efficiency, capital
spending and dividend payments. Increase also
in level of workforce. Significant decrease in
debt ratios.
Martin and Parker 1995 11 UK privatised firms. The observations
are split into five sub-periods: state
ownership, pre-privatisation, post-
announcement, post privatisation,
recession (1989-92).
Labour and total factor productivity. Decrease in post-privatisation period and
increase in pre-privatisation one (anticipation
effect) for labour indices. Increase  of
performance in post-privatisation period for total
factor indicators.
Waddam Price and Weyman-Jones 1996 12 regional firms of British Gas, over the
period 1977-91.
Analysis of productivity conditions
through Malmquist index.
The technical progress coefficient (frontier shift)
overcome the productivity endogenous increase
one (catching up). The privatisations appears
poorly incisive.
Boussofiane, Martin and Parker 1998 9 UK privatised firms observed over the
period 1973-95.
Definition of technical efficiency scores
using Data Envelopment Analysis.
No clear finding of positive impact of
privatisation over productivity gains. Business
cycle and technical progress don’t alter
substantially the results.
Dewenter and Malatesta 1998 500 privately and publicly-owned large
firms around the world for each of the
three years considered 1975, 85, 95 (total
of 1500 firms-year). Complete time series
for 63 privatized companies around the
world for up to 10 years before and 5 after
privatization.
Profitability, leverage and labour
efficiency indices.
Cross-section analysis (over the three years
1975, 85, 95) shows that publicly-owned firms
are less profitable, more leveraged and more
labour intensive than privately-owned ones.
Time series analysis shows mixed results for
privatization. There is evidence of an
anticipation effect, specially in profitability
indicators.
Fraquelli and Fabbri 1998 20 Italian privatised firms observed over 3
years before and after privatisation.
Profitability, productivity and financial
ratios that have been normalised through
“public”, “private” and “sectorial” control
sample.
Statistically significant increase of operative
profitability and labour efficiency. Strong
persistence of financial leverage.
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Table 2 – Arithmetic means of DEA scores without business cycle variable
(CRS at constant prices relating to SAL and VA)  a
Unbalanced sample Balanced sample 25 units Balanced sample 16 units
No. CRS
SAL
CRS
VA
CRS
SAL
CRS
VA
CRS
SAL
CRS
VA
t-5 22 96.8 87.0
t-4 28 97.1 85.4 98.0 85.9
t-3 33 97.5 86.9 97.8 87.3 97.3 85.3
t-2 39 97.9 87.9 98.1 86.9 97.7 83.9
t-1 39 97.5 86.5 97.3 85.9 96.9 84.3
t 39 97.3 87.2 96.8 86.5 96.9 86.1
t+1 39 98.0 87.8 97.6 86.6 97.0 84.9
t+2 39 98.4 91.8 98.6 92.8 98.3 90.4
t+3 31 96.6 86.1 96.1 84.7 94.2 77.5
t+4 22 97.6 87.7 96.7 83.5
t+5 16 96.8 86.9
average before (t-5;   t-1) 97.4 86.7 (t-3;   t-1) 97.7 86.7 (t-4;   t-1) 97.5 84.9
average after (t+1; t+5) 97.5 88.1 (t+1; t+3) 97.4 88.0 (t+1; t+4) 96.5 84.1
average before (t-2;   t-1) 97.7 87.2 (t-2;   t-1) 97.7 86.4 (t-2;   t-1) 97.3 84.1
average after (t+1; t+2) 98.2 89.8 (t+1; t+2) 98.1 89.7 (t+1; t+2) 97.7 87.6
(a) On the basis of the Wilcoxon test the ratings relating to the year before and after privatization are not statistically different.
Table 3 - Arithmetic means of DEA scores with business cycle variable
(CRS at constant prices relating to SAL and VA) b
Unbalanced sample Balanced sample 25 units Balanced sample 16 units
No. CRS
SAL
CRS
VA
CRS
SAL
CRS
VA
CRS
SAL
CRS
VA
t-5 22 97.2 90.8
t-4 28 97.9 88.1 98.6 88.5
t-3 33 98.0 87.9 98.4 88.2 98.1 86.8
t-2 39 98.4 89.1 98.5 88.0 98.1 85.2
t-1 39 97.8 87.4 97.7 87.0 97.5 85.9
t 39 97.7 88.3 97.3 87.9 97.4 87.6
t+1 39 98.2 88.1 98.0 87.9 97.4 85.7
t+2 39 98.4 91.9 98.7 93.5 98.3 91.4
t+3 31 96.8 86.2 96.3 85.1 94.4 77.7
t+4 22 97.7 88.0 96.8 84.1
t+5 16 96.8 87.3
average before (t-5;   t-1) 97.9 88.7 (t-3;   t-1) 98.2 87.7 (t-4;   t-1) 98.1 86.6
average after (t+1; t+5) 97.6 88.3 (t+1; t+3) 97.7 88.8 (t+1; t+4) 96.7 84.7
average before (t-2;   t-1) 98.1 88.2 (t-2;   t-1) 98.1 87.5 (t-2;   t-1) 97.8 85.5
average after (t+1; t+2) 98.3 90.0 (t+1; t+2) 98.3 90.7 (t+1; t+2) 97.9 88.6
(b) On the basis of the Wilcoxon test the ratings relating to the year before and after privatization are not statistically different.
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Table 4 – Arithmetic means of DEA scores for firms under foreign and Italian control without
business cycle variable
(CRS at constant prices relating to SAL and VA)
Foreign groups Italian groups
No. CRS
SAL
CRS
VA
No. CRS
SAL
CRS
VA
t-5 6 92.5 83.6 16 98.4 88.2
t-4 6 94.2 74.7 22 97.9 88.3
t-3 7 96.1 80.1 26 97.8 88.7
t-2 8 95.3 80.4 31 98.6 89.9
t-1 8 97.8 84.7 31 97.5 87.0
t 8 97.8 88.5 31 97.1 86.9
t+1 8 97.9 87.5 31 98.0 87.9
t+2 8 98.8 93.0 31 98.3 91.5
t+3 6 99.7 96.7 25 95.8 83.6
t+4  c 2 - - 20 97.4 86.7
t+5  c 2 - - 14 96.4 85.8
average before (t-5;   t-1) 95.2 80.7 (t-5;   t-1) 98.0 88.4
average after (t+1; t+3) 98.8 92.4 (t+1; t+5) 97.2 87.1
***
average before (t-2;   t-1) 96.5 82.5 (t-2;   t-1) 98.1 88.4
average after (t+1; t+2) 98.3 90.2 (t+1; t+2) 98.2 89.7
***
Wilcoxon test: statistically significant to 1%*, 5%**, 10%***
(c) The corresponding CRS average values are omitted because of the small number of observations.
Table 5 – Arithmetic means of the factors productivity indices
Unbalanced sample Balanced sample 25 units Balanced sample 16 units
SAL VA SAL VA SAL SAL VA SAL VA SAL SAL VA SAL VA SALNo.
NEMPL GFA+NCS CMAT NEMPL GFA+NCS CMAT NEMPL GFA+NCS CMAT
t-5 22 47.2 57.5 66.4 71.6 88.3
t-4 28 54.5 58.2 71.0 69.8 84.7 49.4 57.3 69.9 76.7 86.6
t-3 33 59.3 61.7 75.7 73.4 85.8 56.9 59.6 74.4 72.9 85.6 55.5 63.4 65.6 72.1 87.1
t-2 39 60.5 63.5 76.7 75.6 87.7 58.9 60.5 74.0 71.4 85.0 56.5 61.8 64.8 68.6 85.5
t-1 39 62.5 65.5 73.6 72.6 87.2 61.6 65.1 70.6 70.2 84.3 57.2 66.4 64.1 69.8 84.0
t 39 64.8 68.5 72.3 71.0 86.4 64.1 68.6 71.0 69.8 83.7 60.4 71.6 66.5 71.6 83.5
t+1 39 71.2 73.0 72.5 70.0 85.8 64.7 68.7 69.6 68.3 84.0 61.2 69.9 68.7 70.8 83.0
t+2 39 79.6 80.8 76.7 73.0 85.1 78.2 82.0 74.9 72.5 83.1 72.4 81.1 74.3 75.6 81.7
t+3 31 74.9 72.6 71.7 65.6 83.1 75.2 72.8 70.8 63.9 80.0 68.2 68.3 68.4 63.8 77.7
t+4 22 75.3 76.4 70.2 68.2 83.7 73.0 74.1 66.2 62.0 77.5
t+5 16 70.7 73.6 72.2 71.0 84.2
average before (t-5;   t-1) 56.8 61.3 72.7 72.6 86.7 (t-3;   t-1) 59.1 61.7 73.0 71.5 85.0 (t-4;   t-1) 54.6 62.2 66.1 71.8 85.8
average after (t+1; t+5) 74.3 75.3 72.7 69.5 84.4 (t+1; t+3) 72.7 74.5 71.8 68.2 82.3 (t+1; t+4) 68.7 73.3 69.4 68.0 80.0
* * * * ** ** **
average before (t-2;   t-1) 61.5 64.5 75.1 74.1 87.4 (t-2;   t-1) 60.2 62.8 72.3 70.8 84.6 (t-2;   t-1) 56.9 64.1 64.5 69.2 84.8
average after (t+1; t+2) 75.4 76.9 74.6 71.5 85.4 (t+1; t+2) 71.5 75.4 72.3 70.4 83.5 (t+1; t+2) 66.8 75.5 71.5 73.2 82.4
* * ** * **
Wilcoxon test: statistically significant to 1%*, 5%**, 10%***
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Figure 3 -  Trend of the average factors productivity indices relating to SAL for the 
unbalanced sample
45,0
50,0
55,0
60,0
65,0
70,0
75,0
80,0
85,0
90,0
95,0
t-5 t-4 t-3 t-2 t-1 t t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5
SAL/NEMPL SAL/(GFA+NCS) SAL/CMAT
Figure 2 - Trend of the average DEA scores 
(CRS at constant prices relating to SAL  without business cycle variable)
94,0
94,5
95,0
95,5
96,0
96,5
97,0
97,5
98,0
98,5
99,0
t-5 t-4 t-3 t-2 t-1 t t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5
CRS relating to SAL for unbalanced sample CRS relating to SAL for balanced sample 25 units
CRS relating to SAL for balanced sample 16 units
Ceris-CNR, W.P. N° 5/1999 
 
 26
 
References 
 
Anderson S. P., De Palma A., Thisse J. F., 1997, “Privatization  and efficiency in a 
differentiated industry”, European Economic Review, no. 41, 1635-1654. 
Barca F., 1994, “Allocazione e riallocazione della proprietà e del controllo delle imprese: 
ostacoli, intermediari, regole”, in Il mercato della proprietà e del controllo delle imprese: 
aspetti teorici e istituzionali, Special edition of “Contributi all'Analisi Economica”, Banca 
d’Italia, 11-60. 
Barca F., Ferri G., 1994, Crescita e riallocazione del controllo: Teoria e prime evidenze 
empiriche per l'Italia, in Il mercato della proprietà e del controllo delle imprese: aspetti 
teorici e istituzionali, Special edition of “Contributi all'Analisi Economica”, Banca 
d'Italia, 363-406. 
Bertero E., Rondi L., 1998, “Managerial discretion and investment decisions of state-owned 
firms: evidence from a panel of Italian companies”, Public Choise, forthcoming. 
Bertero E., Rondi L., 1997, “Does debt discipline state owned firms? Evidence from a panel of 
Italian firms”, Special Paper no. 98, Financial markets group, London School of 
Economics. 
Bishop M., Thompson D., 1992, “Regulatory reform and productivity growth in the UK’s 
public utilities”, Applied Economics, no. 24, 1181-1190. 
Bös D., 1991, Privatization: a theoretical treatment, Clarendon Press, Oxford. 
Boussofiane A., Martin S., Parker D., 1997, “The impact on technical efficiency of the UK 
privatization programme”, Applied Economics, no. 29, 297-310. 
Boussofiane A., Dyson R. G., Thanassoulis E., 1991, “Applied Data Envelopment Analysis”, 
European Journal of Operational Research, no. 52, 1-15. 
Boycko M., Shleifer A., Vishny R. W., 1996, “A theory of privatization”, The Economic 
Journal, no. 106, 309-319. 
Cannari L., Marchese G., Pagnini M., 1994, Forma giuridica, quotazione e struttura 
proprietaria delle imprese italiane: prime evidenze comparate, in Il mercato della 
proprietà e del controllo delle imprese: aspetti teorici e istituzionali, Special edition of 
“Contributi all'Analisi Economica”, Banca d'Italia, 257-297. 
Caves R., 1996, Multinational enterprise and economic analysis, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge. 
Centrale dei Bilanci, 1995, Economia e finanza delle imprese italiane, Bancaria Editrice. 
Charnes A., Cooper W. W., Rhodes E., 1978, “Measuring the efficiency of decision making 
units”, European Journal of Operational Research, no. 2, 429-444. 
Coelli T., Prasada Rao D.S., Battese G.E., 1998, An introduction to efficiency and productivity 
analysis, Kluver Academic Publishers, Boston/Dordrecht/ London. 
De Fraja G., 1993, “Productive efficiency in public and private firms”, Journal of Public 
Economics, no. 50, 15-30. 
Dewenter K. L., Malatesta P.H., 1998, “State-owned and privately-owned firms: an empirical 
analysis of profitability, leverage and labour intensity”, School of Business, University of  
Washington. 
Dilling-Hansen M., Eriksson T., Madsen E. S., Smith V., 1999, “The influence of competition 
Ceris-CNR, W.P. N° 5/1999 
 
 27
and ownership structure on the performance of Danish manifacturing firms”, EARIE 
Conference, Torino. 
Dunsire A., Hartley K., Parker D., 1991, “Organisational status and performance: summary of 
the findings”, Public Administration, vol. 69, 21-40. 
Farrell M.J., 1957, “The measurement of productive efficiency”, Journal of the Royal Statistical 
Society, series A, no. 120, 253-281. 
Fraquelli G., 1997, Elementi di economia manageriale, costi, produttività, investimenti, Utet 
Libreria, Torino. 
Fraquelli G., Fabbri P., 1998, “Prima e dopo la privatizzazione: un confronto tra imprese 
operanti in concorrenza”, Economia e Politica Industriale, no. 98, 127-153. 
Grossman S.J., Hart O.D., 1986, “The costs and benefits of ownership: a theory of vertical and 
lateral integration”, Journal of Political Economy, vol. 94, no. 4, 691-719. 
Hart O. D., 1990, “An economist’s perspective on the theory of the firm”, Columbia Law 
Review, 1757-1774. 
Hart O. D., Moore J., 1990, "Property Rights and the nature of the firm", Journal of Political 
Economy, vol. 98, no. 6, 1119-1158. 
Hartley K., Martin S., Parker D., 1991, “Organisational status, ownership and productivity”, 
Fiscal Studies, vol. 12, no. 2, 46-60. 
Hartley K., Parker D., 1991a, “Do changes in organizational status affect financial 
performance?”, Strategic Management Journal, vol. 12, 631-641. 
Hartley K., Parker D., 1991b, “Organizational status and performance: the effects on 
employment”, Applied Economics, no. 23, 403-416. 
Haskel J., Szymanski S., 1993, “The effects of privatization, restructuring and competition on 
productivity growth in UK public corporations”, Working Paper no. 286, Department of 
Economics, Queen Mary and Westfield College, University of London. 
Hay D.A., Liu G.S., 1997, “The efficiency of firms: what difference does competition make?”, 
The Economic Journal, no. 107, 597-617. 
Hutchinson G., 1991, “Efficiency gains through privatization of UK industries”, in Hartley K., 
Ott A. F., Privatization  and economic efficiency: a comparative analysis of developed 
and developing countries, Aldershot: Edward Elgar. 
Kay J.A., Thompson D.J., 1986, “Privatization: a policy in search of a rationale”, The Economic 
Journal, no. 96, 18-32. 
Laffont J. J., Tirole J., 1986, “Using cost observation to regulate firms”, Journal of Political 
Economy, vol. 94, 614-641. 
Molyneux R., Thompson D., 1987, “National industry performance: sill third rate?”, Fiscal 
Studies, vol. 8, no.1, 48-82. 
Margon D., Sembenelli A., Vannoni D., 1995, “Panel Ceris su dati di impresa: aspetti 
metodologici e istruzioni per l’uso”, Working Paper Ceris-Cnr, no. 7. 
Martin S., Parker D., 1995, “The impact of privatization on labour and total factor productivity”, 
Scottish Journal of Political Economy, vol. 42, no. 2, 201-220. 
Martin S., Parker D., 1998, The impact of privatization:ownership and corporate performance 
in the UK, Routledge, London and New York. 
Megginson W. L., Nash R. C., Van Randenborgh M., 1994, “The financial and operating 
Ceris-CNR, W.P. N° 5/1999 
 
 28
performance of newly privatized firms: an international empirical analysis”, Journal of 
Finance, vol. 49, no. 2, 403-452. 
Nickell S., 1996, “Competition and corporate performance”, Journal of Political Economy, vol 
104, no. 4, 724-746. 
Nickell S., Wadhwani S., Wall M., 1992, “Productivity growth in UK companies, 1975-1986”, 
European Economic Review, no. 36, 1055-1091. 
Niskanen W. A., 1971, Bureaucracy and representative government, New York. 
Nomisma, 1996, “Privatizzazioni 1983-1995”, Banca Dati, Laboratorio di Politica Industriale, 
Nomisma, Bologna. 
Pint E.M., 1991, “Nationalization vs regulation of monopoly. The effects of ownership on 
efficiency”, Journal of Public Economics, no. 41, 151-164. 
Sarno D., 1993, “Un’analisi comparata della performance di imprese di proprietà pubblica e di 
proprietà privata: il caso di un campione di imprese ‘dismesse’ dalle PP.SS”, Politica 
Economica, no.3, 367-396. 
Schmidt M.K., 1996, “The costs and benefits of privatization: an incomplete contracts 
approach”, The Journal of Law, Economics & Organization, vol. 12, no. 1, 1-24. 
Tirole J., 1988, The theory of industrial organization, MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts.  
Trento S., 1992, “ Proprietà ed efficienza: est e ovest di fronte alle privatizzazioni”, Politica 
Economica, no. 2, 201-223. 
Vickers J., Yarrow G., 1988, Privatization: an economic analysis, Mit Press, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts. 
Waddams Price C., Weyman-Jones T., 1996, “Malmquist indices of productivity change in the 
UK gas industry before and after privatization”, Applied Economics, no. 28, 29-39. 
Williamson O. E., 1975, Markets and hierarchies: analysis and antitrust implications, New 
York, Free Press. 
Yarrow G., 1986, “Privatization in theory and practice”, Economic Policy, no. 2, 323-377.  
Zanetti G., Alzona G., 1998, Capire le privatizzazioni, Universale Paperbacks, Il Mulino, 
Bologna. 
 
 
 
WORKING  PAPER  SERIES (1999-1993) 
1999 
1/99 La valutazione delle politiche locali per l’innovazione: il caso dei Centri Servizi in Italia, by Monica Cariola and 
Secondo Rolfo, January 
2/99 Trasferimento tecnologico ed autofinanziamento: il caso degli Istituti Cnr in Piemonte, by Mario Coccia, March 
3/99 Empirical studies of vertical integration: the transaction cost orthodoxy, by Davide Vannoni, March 
4/99 Developing innovation in small-medium suppliers: evidence from the Italian car industry, by Giuseppe 
Calabrese, April  
5/99 Privatization in Italy: an analysis of factors productivity and technical efficiency, by Giovanni Fraquelli and 
Fabrizio Erbetta, March 
6/99 New Technology Based-Firms in Italia: analisi di un campione di imprese triestine, by Anna Maria Gimigliano, 
April 
7/99 Trasferimento tacito della conoscenza: gli Istituti CNR dell’Area di Ricerca di Torino, by Mario Coccia, May 
8/99 Struttura ed evoluzione di un distretto industriale piemontese: la produzione di casalinghi nel Cusio, by 
Alessandra Ressico, June 
9/99 Analisi sistemica della performance nelle strutture di ricerca, by Mario Coccia, September 
10/99 The entry mode choice of EU leading companies (1987-1997), by Giampaolo Vitali, November 
11/99 Esperimenti di trasferimento tecnologico alle piccole e medie imprese nella Regione Piemonte, by Mario Coccia, 
November 
12/99 A mathematical model for performance evaluation in the R&D laboratories: theory and application in Italy, by 
Mario Coccia, November 
13/99 Trasferimento tecnologico: analisi dei fruitori, by Mario Coccia, December 
14/99 Beyond profitability: effects of acquisitions on technical efficiency and productivity in the Italian pasta industry, 
by Luigi Benfratello, December 
15/99 Determinanti ed effetti delle fusioni e acquisizioni: un’analisi sulla base delle notifiche alle autorità antitrust, by 
Luigi Benfratello, December 
 
 
 
1998 
1/98 Alcune riflessioni preliminari sul mercato degli strumenti multimediali, by Paolo Vaglio, January 
2/98 Before and after privatization: a comparison between competitive firms, by Giovanni Fraquelli and Paola Fabbri, 
January 
3/98 Not available 
4/98 Le importazioni come incentivo alla concorrenza: l'evidenza empirica internazionale e il caso del mercato unico 
europeo, by Anna Bottasso, May 
5/98 SEM and the changing structure of EU Manufacturing, 1987-1993, by Stephen Davies, Laura Rondi and 
Alessandro Sembenelli, November 
6/98 The diversified firm: non formal theories versus formal models, by Davide Vannoni, December 
7/98 Managerial discretion and investment decisions of state-owned firms: evidence from a panel of Italian 
companies, by Elisabetta Bertero and Laura Rondi, December 
8/98 La valutazione della R&S in Italia: rassegna delle esperienze del C.N.R. e proposta di un approccio alternativo, 
by Domiziano Boschi, December 
9/98 Multidimensional Performance in Telecommunications, Regulation and Competition: Analysing the European 
Major Players, by Giovanni Fraquelli and Davide Vannoni, December 
 
 
1997 
1/97 Multinationality, diversification  and firm size. An empirical analysis of Europe's leading firms, by Stephen 
Davies, Laura Rondi and Alessandro Sembenelli, January 
2/97 Qualità totale e organizzazione del lavoro nelle aziende sanitarie, by Gian Franco Corio, January 
3/97 Reorganising the product and process development in Fiat Auto, by Giuseppe Calabrese, February  
4/97 Buyer-supplier best practices in product development: evidence from car industry, by Giuseppe Calabrese, April 
5/97 L’innovazione nei distretti industriali. Una rassegna ragionata della letteratura, by Elena Ragazzi, April 
6/97 The impact of financing constraints on markups: theory and evidence from Italian firm level data, by Anna 
Bottasso, Marzio Galeotti and Alessandro Sembenelli, April 
7/97 Capacità competitiva e evoluzione strutturale dei settori di specializzazione: il caso delle macchine per 
confezionamento e imballaggio, by Secondo Rolfo, Paolo Vaglio, April 
8/97 Tecnologia e produttività delle aziende elettriche municipalizzate, by Giovanni Fraquelli and Piercarlo Frigero, 
April 
9/97 La normativa nazionale e regionale per l’innovazione e la qualità nelle piccole e medie imprese: leggi, risorse, 
risultati e nuovi strumenti, by Giuseppe Calabrese, June 
10/97 European integration and leading firms’ entry and exit strategies, by Steve Davies, Laura Rondi and Alessandro 
Sembenelli, April 
11/97 Does debt discipline state-owned firms? Evidence from a panel of Italian firms, by Elisabetta Bertero and Laura 
Rondi, July 
12/97 Distretti industriali e innovazione: i limiti dei sistemi tecnologici locali, by Secondo Rolfo and Giampaolo 
Vitali, July 
13/97 Costs, technology and ownership form of natural gas distribution in Italy, by Giovanni Fraquelli and Roberto 
Giandrone, July 
14/97 Costs and structure of technology in the Italian water industry, by Paola Fabbri and Giovanni Fraquelli, July 
15/97 Aspetti e misure della customer satisfaction/dissatisfaction, by Maria Teresa Morana, July 
16/97 La qualità nei servizi pubblici: limiti della normativa UNI EN 29000 nel settore sanitario, by Efisio Ibba, July 
17/97 Investimenti, fattori finanziari e ciclo economico, by Laura Rondi and Alessandro Sembenelli, rivisto sett. 1998 
18/97 Strategie di crescita esterna delle imprese leader in Europa: risultati preliminari dell'utilizzo del data-base 
Ceris "100 top EU firms' acquisition/divestment database 1987-1993", by Giampaolo Vitali and Marco 
Orecchia, December 
19/97 Struttura e attività dei Centri Servizi all'innovazione: vantaggi e limiti dell'esperienza italiana, by Monica 
Cariola, December 
20/97 Il comportamento ciclico dei margini di profitto in presenza di mercati del capitale meno che perfetti: un'analisi 
empirica su dati di impresa in Italia, by Anna Bottasso, December 
 
 
1996 
1/96 Aspetti e misure della produttività. Un'analisi statistica su tre aziende elettriche europee, by Donatella 
Cangialosi, February 
2/96 L'analisi e la valutazione della soddisfazione degli utenti interni: un'applicazione nell'ambito dei servizi sanitari, 
by Maria Teresa Morana, February 
3/96 La funzione di costo nel servizio idrico. Un contributo al dibattito sul metodo normalizzato per la 
determinazione della tariffa del servizio idrico integrato, by Giovanni Fraquelli and Paola Fabbri, February 
4/96 Coerenza d'impresa e diversificazione settoriale: un'applicazione alle società leaders nell'industria 
manifatturiera europea, by Marco Orecchia, February 
5/96 Privatizzazioni: meccanismi di collocamento e assetti proprietari. Il caso STET, by Paola Fabbri, February 
6/96 I nuovi scenari competitivi  nell'industria delle telecomunicazioni: le principali esperienze internazionali, by 
Paola Fabbri, February 
7/96 Accordi, joint-venture e investimenti diretti dell'industria italiana nella CSI: Un'analisi qualitativa, by Chiara 
Monti and Giampaolo Vitali, February 
8/96 Verso la riconversione di settori utilizzatori di amianto.  Risultati di un'indagine sul campo, by Marisa Gerbi 
Sethi, Salvatore Marino  and Maria Zittino, February 
9/96 Innovazione tecnologica e competitività internazionale: quale futuro per i distretti e le economie locali, by 
Secondo Rolfo, March 
10/96 Dati disaggregati e analisi della struttura industriale: la matrice europea delle quote di mercato, by Laura 
Rondi, March 
11/96 Le decisioni di entrata e di uscita: evidenze empiriche sui maggiori gruppi italiani, by Alessandro Sembenelli 
and Davide Vannoni, April 
12/96 Le direttrici della diversificazione nella grande industria italiana, by Davide Vannoni, April 
13/96 R&S cooperativa e non-cooperativa in un duopolio misto con spillovers, by Marco Orecchia, May 
14/96 Unità di studio sulle strategie di crescita esterna delle imprese italiane, by Giampaolo Vitali and Maria Zittino, 
July. Not available 
15/96 Uno strumento di politica per l'innovazione: la prospezione tecnologica, by Secondo Rolfo, September 
16/96 L'introduzione della Qualità Totale in aziende ospedaliere: aspettative ed opinioni del middle management, by 
Gian Franco Corio, September 
17/96 Shareholders’ voting power and block transaction premia: an empirical analysis of Italian listed companies, by 
Giovanna Nicodano and Alessandro Sembenelli, November 
18/96 La valutazione dell'impatto delle politiche tecnologiche: un'analisi classificatoria e una rassegna di alcune 
esperienze europee, by Domiziano Boschi, November 
19/96 L'industria orafa italiana: lo sviluppo del settore punta sulle esportazioni, by Anna Maria Gaibisso and Elena 
Ragazzi, November 
20/96 La centralità dell'innovazione nell'intervento pubblico nazionale e regionale in Germania, by Secondo Rolfo, 
December 
21/96 Ricerca, innovazione e mercato: la nuova politica del Regno Unito, by Secondo Rolfo, December 
22/96 Politiche per l'innovazione in Francia, by Elena Ragazzi, December 
23/96 La relazione tra struttura finanziaria e decisioni reali delle imprese: una rassegna critica dell'evidenza 
empirica, by Anna Bottasso, December 
 
 
1995 
1/95 Form of ownership and financial constraints: panel data evidence on leverage and investment  choices by Italian 
firms, by Fabio Schiantarelli and Alessandro Sembenelli, March 
2/95 Regulation of the electric supply industry in Italy, by Giovanni Fraquelli and Elena Ragazzi, March 
3/95 Restructuring product development and production networks: Fiat Auto, by Giuseppe Calabrese, September 
4/95 Explaining corporate structure: the MD matrix, product differentiation and size of market, by Stephen Davies, 
Laura Rondi and Alessandro Sembenelli, November 
5/95 Regulation and total productivity performance in electricity: a comparison  between Italy, Germany and France, 
by Giovanni Fraquelli and Davide Vannoni, December 
6/95 Strategie di crescita esterna nel sistema bancario italiano: un'analisi empirica 1987-1994, by Stefano Olivero 
and Giampaolo Vitali, December 
7/95 Panel Ceris su dati di impresa: aspetti metodologici e istruzioni per l'uso, by Diego Margon, Alessandro 
Sembenelli and Davide Vannoni, December 
 
 
1994 
1/94 Una politica industriale per gli investimenti esteri in Italia: alcune riflessioni, by Giampaolo Vitali, May 
2/94 Scelte cooperative in attività di ricerca e sviluppo, by Marco Orecchia, May 
3/94 Perché le matrici intersettoriali per misurare l'integrazione verticale?, by Davide Vannoni, July 
4/94 Fiat Auto: A simultaneous engineering experience, by Giuseppe Calabrese, August 
 
 
1993 
1/93 Spanish machine tool industry, by Giuseppe Calabrese, November 
2/93 The machine tool industry in Japan, by Giampaolo Vitali, November 
3/93 The UK machine tool industry,  by Alessandro Sembenelli  and Paul Simpson, November 
4/93 The Italian  machine tool industry, by Secondo Rolfo, November 
5/93 Firms' financial and real responses to business cycle shocks and monetary tightening: evidence for large and 
small Italian companies, by Laura Rondi, Brian Sack, Fabio Schiantarelli and Alessandro Sembenelli, 
December 
 
 
 
 
 
Free copies are distributed on request to Universities, Research Institutes, researchers, students, etc. 
Please, write to: 
MARIA ZITTINO 
Working Papers Coordinator 
CERIS-CNR 
Via Real Collegio, 30; 10024 Moncalieri (Torino), Italy 
Tel.  +39 011 6824.914;     Fax  +39 011 6824.966;  m.zittino@ceris.cnr.it; http://www.ceris.cnr.it 
 
 
Copyright © 1999  by CNR-Ceris 
All rights reserved. Parts of this paper may be reproduced with the permission of the author(s) and quoting the authors and CNR-
Ceris 
